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NOTES AND COMMENTS
versity of Minnesota, has for the past thirteen years been engaged in
the practice of law in Minneapolis and in the part-time teaching of
Business Law at the University of Minnesota.
Miss Margaret E. Hall, Assistant Law Librarian, has resigned to
become a member of the library staff at the Columbia University Law
School. She has been succeeded for this year by Mrs. Ben Gray Lump-
kin, Law Librarian of the University of Mississippi.
Associate Professor Frank W. Hanft has been promoted to a full
professorship.
Visiting professors during the summer session of 1937 included:
Professors Charles T. McCormick, of Northwestern University; Wal-
ter Wheeler Cook, of Northwestern University; James H. Chadbourn,
of the University of Pennsylvania; and Wesley A. Sturges, of Yale
University.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Charities--Gifts to Enforce Prohibition Laws.
Testator in 1933 left a will providing: "$1,000 to any organization
which may be organized for the purpose of enforcing the prohibition
laws in Gaston County." After testator's death plaintiff corporation
was organized for the above specified purpose with the express power
to receive bequests. In an action against the executors the bequest was
held void whether considered as a gift or as a charitable trust.'
Gifts to aid in prohibiting or minimizing the manufacture, sale, or
use of intoxicating liquors, or to teach the evils of liquor, have been held
to constitute charitable trusts.2 It is no objection to their validity that
the state may have the responsibility for doing what the trustee is di-
rected to do.3 They further either an educational purpose or one ben-
eficial to the welfare of the community.
4
'Dry Forces, Inc. v. Wilkins, 211 N. C. 560, 191 S. E. 8 (1937).
'Haines v. Allen, 78 Ind. 100, 41 Am. Rep. 555 (1881) ; Bo-wditch v. Att'y Gen.,
241 Mass. 168, 134 N. E. 796 (1922). For collections of similar cases see: Notes
(1922) 21 A. L. R. 951, 952; (1931) 73 A. L. R. 1361; ZOLLMAN, AMERICAN LAW
OF CHARITIES (1924) §272.
"Humphrey v. Board of Trustees, 203 N. C. 201, 165 S. E. 547 (1932), (1933)
11 N. C. L. REv. 179.
"'A charity, in the legal sense, may be more fully defined as a gift, to be
applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of
persons, either by bringing their minds or hearts under the influence of education
or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering or restraint, by assisting
them to establish themselves in life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings
or works or otherwise lessening the burdens of government. It is immaterial
whether the purpose is called charitable in the gift itself, if it is so described
as to show that it is charitable in its 'nature." Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen 539,
556 (Mass. 1867). Quoted with approval in Barden v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 152
N. C_. 318, 327, 67 S. E. 971, 975 (1910).
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A charitable trust is not defective because the gift is made to a cor-
poration not in existence at the time of the testator's death, if such cor-
poration is actually created within a reasonable time thereafter.5 There
are two classes of gifts falling into this category. One is a gift to an
organization not even informally in existence at the date of the will.
Thus, where there was a bequest to the German Red Cross Society for
the relief, use, and benefit of widows, orphans, and invalids, and no such
organization was functioning at the testator's death, the bequest was
held to create a valid charitable gift to such an organization when it
was created two years later. 6 The other is a gift to an unincorporated
association which is later incorporated,7 e.g., to the Denver Foundation
for the benefit of the needy people of Denver, 8 or to the Council at
Narragansett Pier, Rhode Island, of the Boy Scouts of America to aid
in carrying on its work.9 In both types of instances the courts have
endeavored to carry out the intent of the testator.
A trust will not be allowed to fail for lack of a trustee,10 or for
failure to use technical language expressing a trust purpose," if it is
otherwise clear that a trust was ihtended.12 This intent will be found
where the object as expressed is not opposed to the provisions or the
policy of the law,13 would be valuable educationally, would reasonably
tend to promote the general welfare of the community, and could be best
administered through the trust device. In such instances a charitable
'Keith v. Scales, 124 N. C. 497, 32 S. E. 809 (1899) (to the Moravian church
of Salem for a church and school) ; It re Durham's Estate, 203 Iowa 497, 211
N. W. 358 (1926) (to the Original Chapter of the Salvation Army located in
Council Bluffs, Iowa) ; In re Rahn's Estate, 316 Mo. 492, 291 S. W. 120, 51 A. L. R.
877 (1927) (German Red Cross case discussed in text) ; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS
(1935) §401, comment k; ZOLLMAN, AMERICAN LAW OF CHARITIES (1924) §§345,
346.
'In re Rahn's Estate, 316 Mo. 492, 291 S. W. 120 (1927).
'ZOLLMAN, AMERICAN LAW OF CHARITIES (1924) §347.
'Jeffreys v. Trust Co., 97 Colo. 188, 48 P. (2d)' 1019 (1935), (1935) 8 RocKxY
MT. L. Rxv. 159 (1935).
'Tillinghast v. Council at Narrangansett Pier, 47 R. I. 406, 133 Atl. 662
(1926), 46 A. L. R. 827 (1927).
20 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §§4023, 4035(a) ; State v. Gerard, 37 N. C.
210 (1842); Goodrum v. Goodrum, 43 N. C. 313 (1852); Keith v. Scales, 124
N. C. 497, 32 S. E. 809 (1899) ; Church v. Trustees, 158 N. C. 119, 73 S. E. 810
(1912) ; Benevolent Society v. Orrell, 195 N. C. 405, 142 S. E. 493 (1928) (a trus-
tee may be appointed either by virtue of the statute or by the superior court in the
exercise of its equitable jurisdiction) ; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) §397 (will not
fail for want of trustee unless settlor manifests an intention that trust shall not
arise unless person named acts as trustee); 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
(1935) §328, n. 21; ZOLLMAN, AMERICAN LAW OF CHAgRiIEs (1924) §459, n. 17;
Note (1920) 5 A. L. R. 315.
"Benevolent Society v. Orrell, 195 N. C. 405, 142 S. E. 493 (1928) ; RESTATE-
MENT, TRUSTS (1935) §351, comment b; ZoLLmAN, AMERIcAN" LAW OF CHARITIES
(1924) §462.
"RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) §351; 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUsTEES (1935)§324.
.3Trust Co. v. Oghurn, 181 N. C. 324, 107 S. E. 238 (1921), (1922) 1 N. C. L,
R~v. 41.
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trust would seem more nearly to comply with the testator's intention
than an absolute gift.14
It is axiomatic that the beneficiaries of a charitable trust must be
incapable of definite ascertainment. 15 The objects and purposes, how-
ever, must be sufficiently concrete to enable the court to frame a decree
and to supervise the trust. 16 That is not to say, however, that the trustee
may not be given discretion to choose the methods and persons through
which the charitable purpose or object is to be effectuated.' 7 Decisions
to the contrary' 8 in North Carolina have been in effect overruled by
the statutet9 enacted in 1925. This statute also extends the area within
which the trustee may be given the choice, from one marked by the
word "charitable" used as a technical word of art, to one which shall
include "benevolent uses."20 And it establishes a public policy in favor
of the liberal construction of "religious, educational, charitable or ben-
evolent uses," by providing that "no gift, grant, bequest or devise,
whether in trust or otherwise," to such uses, "shall be invalid by reason
of any indefiniteness or uncertainty of the object or beneficiaries of such
trust, or because said instrument confers upon the trustee.., discretion-
ary powers in the selection and designation of the objects or beneficiaries
... or in carrying out the purpose thereof."
2'
' Cf. St. James Parish v. Bagley, 138 N. C. 384, 50 S. E. 841 (1905) (to church
corporation for -home for widows and orphans or other religious and charitable
purposes).
RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) §§364, 375 (a trust is not a charitable trust if
the persons who are to benefit are not of a sufficiently large or indefinite class so
that the community as a whole is interested in the enforcement of the trust) ;
ZOLLMAN, Ai~mCAN LAW OF CHARITIES (1924) §353, n. 7 (the greatest of all
solecisms in law, morals, or religion is the supposition of a charity to individuals
personally known and selected by the giver) ; see 2 BoGERT, TRusTS AND TRUSTEES
(1935) §362.
'Haywood v. Craven's Ex'rs, 4 N. C. 360 (1816); White v. University, 39
N. C. 19 (1845) ; Miller v. Atldnson, 63 N. C. 537 (1869) ; Trust Co. v. Ogburn,
181 N. C. 324, 107 S. E. 238 (1921); ZOLLMAN, AmlRicAN LAW OF CHARITIES
(1924) §356.
1 ZOLLMAx, AMEmICA LAW OF CHARITIES (1924) §§434, 435.
Holland v. Peck, 37 N. C. 255 (1842) (to the Methodist Episcopal Church to
be disposed of by members of the conference as they shall in their Godly wisdom
judge will be most beneficial for the increase or prosperity of the gospel) ; Hester
v. Hester, 37 N. C. 330 (1842) (to some promising young man of good talents
and of the Baptist Order, at the discretion of my executors) ; Thomas v. Clay,
187 N. C. 778, 122 S. E. 852 (1924) (to my trustee to be invested by him in such
worthy objects of charity as he determine upon as being in accord with what "my
wishes and tastes in that direction were when living").
" N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §4035(a) ; Legis. (1926) 4 N. C. L. Rav. 15.
Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 10 Ves. 521 (1805) ; In re Cunningham's Will,
206 N. Y. 601, 100 N. E. 437 (1912) (effect of similar statute in New York);
ZOLLMAN, AMERICAN LA w o- CHARITIES (1924) §§54, 55, 56, 401.
Although four cases prior to the principal case, have referred to the statute
since its enactment, none of them has indicated its effect upon the law of charities.
Benevolent Society v. Orrell, 195 N. C. 405, 142 S. E. 493 (1928) ; Hass v. Hass,
195 N. C. 734, 143 S. E. 541 (1928); Whitsett v. Clapp, 200 N. C. 647, 158 S. E.
183 (1931) ; Humphrey v. Board of Trustees, 203 N. C. 201, 165 S. E. 547 (1932),
(1933) 11 N. C. L. REv. 179. It is believed that the statement in (1926) 4 N. C.
L. REv. 15, to the effect that the statute was intended to establish Cy Pres in
North Carolina, is erroneous.
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In the principal case the view that a gift and not a trust was in-
tended is perhaps justified by the fact that if a trust were intended only
the income on the $1,000 would be available for the use specified, and
such income would be a negligible amount; whereas if a gift were in-
tended, the full $1,000 would be available. However, the court dis-
cusses at length the validity of the bequest as a trust, and indicates that
it is void as such. In so doing in the light of the considerations men-
tioned in the foregoing discussion, the court unnecessarily confuses the
law of charitable trusts in North Carolina. The statute of 1925 and its
effects upon the earlier decisions relied on are not mentioned. The
opinion gives the impression that it is still legally impossible for the
trustee of an otherwise valid charitable trust in this state to be given
discretionary powers to select the particular objects and individuals to
be benefitted. And it betrays unawareness of the extent to which the
courts may, upon contests such as that in the principal case, or upon a
petition for instructions, or at the suit of the Attorney General, super-
vise the administration by the charitable trustee.22
Wm. R. DAWES.
Criminal Law-Evidence--Admissibility of Evidence of a
Collateral Offense of Defendant to Prove the
Offense Charged.
D was indicted with state's witness for conspiracy to rob by means
of assault with firearms or other dangerous weapons, and for robbery
in pursuance of the conspiracy. As proof of the conspiracy the lower
court admitted in evidence testimony that a week after the alleged rob-
bery state's witness and D conspired to burn, and did burn, an auto-
mobile to defraud an insurance company. This evidence was admitted
to show identity and guilty knowledge,' and the Supreme Court affirmed
the lower court ruling.2
It is the general rule that a particular crime cannot be proved by
evidence of a distinct, substantive, unconnected collateral offense.8 The
strict application of this rule is obviously desirable. Not only does ev-
idence of other crimes committed by D tend to prejudice and mislead
the jury, but also D might be taken by surprise and be unprepared to
answer the accusation, if innocent, or, if guilty, be unable to mitigate its
effect upon the outcome of the trial for the offense charged in the
IN. C. CODE ANx. (Michie, 1935) §§4033, 4034; Tillinghast v. Council at
Narragansett Pier, 47 R. I. 406, 133 At. 662, 46 A. L. R. 827 (1927) (court set
up a trust until council incorporated).
I Record on Appeal, pp. 57, 351, State v. Flowers, 211 N. C 721, 192 S. E. 110
(1937).
State v. Flowers, 211 N. C 721, 192 S. E. 110 (1937).
People v. Molyneaux, 168 N, Y. 264, 61 N. E. 286 (1901), 62 L, R. A. 193
(1904).
